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The Marketization of HIV/AIDS Governance: Public-Private Partnerships and 
Bureaucratic Culture in Pakistan  
Abstract  
The World Bank-financed ‘Enhanced HIV and AIDS Control Program’ tried to reorganized 
HIV/AIDS governance in Pakistan by pushing a neoliberal agenda of marketizing the 
provision of publicly-funded HIV prevention services. NGOs and the private sector competed 
for contracts with the government to provide services to the quasi-legal population of sex 
workers, drug users, transgendered people and homosexuals who were deemed ‘high risk’ 
groups for HIV. With contractualisation emerged a new bureaucratic field that emphasized 
‘flexible organization’ and ‘efficiency’ in getting things done, in place of the traditional 
bureaucratic proceduralism which has been characteristic of the Pakistani civil service. This 
new corporate-style bureaucratic culture and the ambiguities of a hastily contracted (and 
‘efficiently’ rolled out) Enhanced Program gave occasion to public funds ending up in the 
pockets of a few powerful actors. Instead of generating more efficiency, the marketisation of 
services dispossessed the intended beneficiaries of the World Bank loan.   
 
 
Key words: Bureaucracy, dispossession, entrepreneurial governance, flexible organisation, 
neoliberalization, World Bank  
Introduction 
Sex outside marriage and the non-therapeutic use of drugs are criminalised in Pakistan. The 
state does not work directly with the quasi-legal populations of drug addicts, sex workers, 
transgendered people and homosexuals who are designated ‘high risk groups’ for HIV. 
Although there was no epidemiological data to suggest an imminent threat from HIV, and 
although many of the public health experts in the country considered that there were more 
pressing problems that needed to be addressed (Zaidi 2008), in 2003 the government agreed 
to a ‘soft’ loan by the World Bank to finance an ‘Enhanced HIV and AIDS Control Program’ 
(henceforth the Enhanced Program). This was primarily to roll out targeted interventions 
among the ‘high risk’ groups by contracting-out HIV prevention services to NGOs and 
private firms, following the neoliberal logic of marketizing service provision. In this chapter, 
I explore how this Bank-sponsored public-private partnership sought to restructure the 
government’s bureaucratic management of HIV along the lines of an efficient business, and 
the repercussions of this restructuring for the bureaucratic culture in government departments.  
The Enhanced Program constituted a shift away from bureaucratic proceduralism to ‘flexible 
bureaucracy’, which is a characteristic of what David Mosse  (2005) has called a ‘new 
managerialism in international development’: “as its ends have narrowed to quantified targets 
on poverty and ill-health, the means of international aid have expanded from the management 
of economic growth and technology transfer to the reorganisation of state and society needed 
to deliver on targets” (p.4). In Pakistan’s HIV sector, this reorganisation was achieved 
through the reshuffling of top bureaucrats, often replacing them with experts from outside the 
government, filling key positions in AIDS control departments with ‘market-based’ 
employees, awarding province-wide huge contracts to influential NGOs, obliging the 
government to hire a management consultancy firm to teach them the principles of business 
management, and shelving the rules, regulations and procedures of the government 
bureaucracy in the name of ‘efficiency’. Such policies have been described by Elizabeth 
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Pisani (2010) as a ‘sacred cow’, taken as an article of faith rather than because the private 
sector does demonstrably deliver better results than government services. 
The efficiency-oriented Enhanced Program thus created a new bureaucratic field with new 
rules of the game, which was different from the old-style proceduralist bureaucracy of a 
government department. Mosse has written of situations in which we see local power re-
colonizing the spaces created by external funding regimes and turning ‘new rules to different 
ends’ (2011:6). However, I will argue in the following that it would be more fruitful to see 
the new rules of the game as opening an ambiguous space where vested interests competed 
with the new actors to use the flexible bureaucracies of the AIDS governance as instrument 
of accumulation. I suggest that instead of generating more efficiency, as touted by its 
proponents, the neoliberal logic of ‘entrepreneurial governance’ (du Gay 2000) ended up 
dispossessing its purported beneficiaries – the ‘high-risk groups’. One of the ways in which 
such policies facilitated ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2005) was by turning 
government departments into hatcheries of private interest and entrepreneurship where 
bureaucrats become proprietors of their positions and extended their entrepreneurial networks 
to the private sector. With the shift away from public sector, a new mode of governance was 
taking shape where the government officials were turning into subjects of an ‘entrepreneurial 
self’ (Kelly 2006) with a precarious existence in the market of HIV prevention governed by 
the neoliberal policies of the World Bank.  
The first ethnographic section of this paper opens with an introduction to the flexible 
bureaucracy of Pakistan’s AIDS Control Programme (ACP). The second section further 
explores the efficiency-oriented corporate-style work culture of the Enhanced Program which 
undermined the usual concern for bureaucratic rules and regulations and norms of Pakistani 
civil service. A dispute between a big NGO contracted for HIV prevention under this 
programme and the government’s AIDS control officials is instructive of the ambiguity about 
rules of conduct, confusion over the roles of partners and a sense of distrust and tensions that 
pervaded the intersection of the old proceduralist bureaucracy with the new flexible work 
culture. In the third section, I describe at some length how some actors at this intersection 
took advantage of the flexible bureaucracy and were able to profit from the ambiguities it 
created. The final ethnographic section outlines some of the predicaments of the staff at the 
ACP when the Enhanced Program was rolled back. As I will argue, the new flexible work 
culture introduced heightened precariousness in the HIV sector as a whole but the employees 
at the ACP were particularly exposed to uncertainty due to an unexpected withdrawal of the 
World Bank from the second phase of the Enhanced Program.  
The Enhanced Program as a new work culture 
To the outsider, the first-timer or an occasional visitor, the ACP might appear like any other 
government department. But when I started working there in 2010 as an intern carrying out 
ethnographic fieldwork on Pakistan’s response towards HIV/AIDS, I realized that it 
represented quite a different bureaucratic set-up. I was introduced to an institution without a 
manager, as, I was told by a colleague in the HIV sector, the previous national manager had 
just got ‘shafted’ by an NGO in a fight for a larger slice of the pie for the government in the 
upcoming Global Fund grant: ‘the country is awash with money and heads had to roll in the 
fight for cash’. The Enhanced Program had resulted in internal restructuring and considerable 
confusion as to who was in-charge and what rules were to be followed in this vertical health 
programme. For example, my initial contact point Dr Naseem was the longest-serving senior 
employee, yet he could not be designated as deputy manager and given charge in the absence 
of the national manager because he was ‘hired from the market’ and served in a ‘donor-
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funded position’. He claimed to run the ACP single-handedly in the absence of a national 
manager. Yet, when I requested an internship at the organization, he insisted on a written 
application that came ‘through proper channel’, signed by the ‘competent authority’ in the 
Ministry of Health, and a written assurance that I would follow government rules and 
regulations in ‘letter and spirit’, phrases that are proverbial in postcolonial bureaucracies of 
the subcontinent. In contrast with other recent depictions of the Pakistani bureaucracy (e.g. 
Hull 2012), the ACP presented me with a mix of the new market-oriented corporate culture 
and old-fashioned bureaucratic proceduralism – what might be thought of as a ‘hybrid 
bureaucracy’. 
How did this hybrid bureaucracy come about? In 2003, World Bank experts managed to 
convince the then finance minister to invest in ‘scaling up’ the HIV response by representing 
HIV as a development problem for Pakistan. Being a former city banker who had recently 
arrived from Washington to serve in General Musharaf’s technocratic military regime, the 
finance minister, Shaukat Aziz, took a favourable view of the Bank’s development policies. 
A ‘soft’ loan programme was agreed under which the government would contribute less than 
15 percent of the project cost (US$ 47.7 million) while the remaining 85 percent would be 
made available by the Bank. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and 
British Department for International Development (DFID) also agreed to provide some part 
of the grant as a gesture of their approval of the Enhanced Program. The Ministry of Health 
(MoH) was sidelined by the Ministry of Finance in negotiating the loan and designing the 
Enhanced Program with the Bank’s experts. A senior MoH bureaucrat who previously served 
as the manager of the ACP was replaced by a junior employee who had proven herself to be 
openly receptive to the Bank’s guidance. 
The new ‘scaled-up’ version of the ACP offered big ‘market-based’ salaries and incentives, 
which attracted government servants from other departments, contractual employees from the 
‘market’, and highly paid US-educated public health experts and consultants. Among the 68 
staff at the ACP by July 2010, 38 were ‘Basic Pay Scale’ employees seconded from various 
government departments, 10 were ‘Market-based Employees’ on short term renewable 
contracts, and the remaining 20 were ‘Donor-supported Employees’.  The ‘Basic Pay Scale 
employees’ were permanent government servants with statutory right to entitlements under a 
cadre system. They were assigned by the ‘competent authority’ in their ‘parent departments’ 
to work on secondment in the ACP, where they received extra benefits. The ‘Market-based 
employees’ were hired on short term renewable contracts with no rights to pension or other 
statutory benefits of government service. The ‘Donor-supported employees’ were mostly 
highly-educated public health experts who were on the payroll of donor agencies but worked 
at the ACP. Thus, career bureaucrats worked alongside the newly hired market-based US-
educated public health specialists, bosses of the contracted NGOs, experts from the World 
Bank, and the business executives of a management firm that was hired to build the capacity 
of the government officials, as I show in later sections of this paper. Another common feature 
of the day-to-day work at the ACP was its technical assistance from a fleet of freelance 
consultants, who were called upon from time to time to build the capacity of the government 
officials or to directly handle the logistics of organizing seminars and workshops 
Under the rubric of the Enhanced Program, the norms of a proceduralist government 
bureaucracy—inherited by generations of mandarins from the kaghazi raj or the ‘document 
rule’ of British India (Moir 1993; Saumarez-Smith 1985; Hull 2012) or the earlier ‘paper 
government’ of the Mughal administrations (Sarkar 1935) – now intersected with a new 
‘efficiency-oriented’ work culture premised on neoliberal ethics, undermining the 
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bureaucrats’ concern with government rules and procedures. ‘Efficiency’ was at the core of 
this new flexible work culture geared towards ‘delivering on targets’. For the ease of 
management, huge province-wide HIV prevention contracts were given to a few big NGOs 
under ‘output-based’, ‘lumpsum’ contracting which meant that the success of a contract was 
to be measured by a decrease in the infection rates among targeted groups, calculated on 
yearly basis by the CIDA-funded HIV and AIDS Surveillance Project (HASP). In other 
words, the contracts were not designed for the government to verify the extent and the quality 
of services provided by the contracted parties. Moreover, in keeping with the principle of 
confidentiality, the NGOs were under no obligation to share information on the particulars of 
service inputs which could compromise protecting personal details of their users. A very 
weak monitoring system that was built around the disbursement of money to the NGOs was 
dominated by a management consultancy firm, which eventually overextended its remit to 
establish itself as a broker, as I discuss below. Only in the case of a few small NGOs, the 
government bureaucrats managed to assert their authority by using traditional auditing 
procedures, i.e. record-keeping and on-the-ground verification. 
AIDS control in Pakistan was thus reorganized on the lines of ‘entrepreneurial governance’, 
driven by goals and not by rules and regulations, based on market rationality and oriented 
towards efficiency through ‘contractualisation’. It was a workplace where performance was 
measured by focusing not on inputs, but on outcomes (du Gay 2000). A stated rationale for 
contracting out service delivery to NGOs and the private sector was the quasi-legal status of 
the ‘risk-groups’ and the presumed inability of the government services to work with 
stigmatized and marginal groups. In this sense, therefore, the ‘cultural difference’ of the so-
called ‘risk-groups’ became another justification for neoliberal policies (see also Elyachar 
2002). ‘Contractualisation’ redefined the organisational relations within AIDS bureaucracy 
whereby, as Colin Leys writes about the reorganisation of civil service in the UK under the 
New Labour government, seasoned mandarins were replaced by enterprising, assertive 
characters with a concern for ‘getting things done’, and ‘an impatience with the bureaucrats 
professionally concerned with to wider implications of policy’ (Leys 2006:21). The 
neoliberal push by the Work Bank was, therefore, no less than an attempt at ‘reorganization 
of the state and society needed to deliver on targets’ that David Mosse (2005: 4) talks about 
in relation to a ‘new managerialism in international development’. 
A dispute with a big NGO 
The case of Naya Sewaira (NS) stood out as the biggest challenge to the bureaucratic 
authority of the government officials and is illustrative of the ambiguity about the rules that 
governed this public-private partnership. In 2010, a dispute flared up between NS and the 
government of Punjab when the NGO, citing relevant clauses of the ‘output based’ contract, 
refused to share with the government the details of its project inputs and service users. NS 
was the largest NGO in the Enhanced Program with a contract to provide HIV prevention for 
Injecting Drug Users (IDUs) in 12 cities. Following the refusal by the NGO to share the 
service users’ details, the newly-appointed health secretary of the provincial government 
terminated NS’s contract, removed the incumbent provincial AIDS control manager, Dr Wali, 
and initiated a corruption inquiry by appointing a new provincial manager Dr Shareef. The 
line of thinking in the government was summed up by Dr Shareef, who replaced his 
discredited predecessor and served as the mouthpiece for the health secretary: ‘we 
[government] give them money to provide [HIV prevention] services. Why can’t they [NS] 
share with us what they have been doing in the field? We are the government, we are 
responsible people. What is so confidential about this data?’   
6 
 
With the contract terminated, NS immediately stopped HIV prevention services and started a 
media campaign against the government and the health secretary accusing them of 
pressurising the NGO to compromise the confidentiality of its service users. The secretary 
had to drop the demand for the personal identifiers of IDUs when he realised the grave 
concern with which the donor community regarded a potential breach of the principle of 
confidentiality. Nevertheless, he insisted that the government had a right to track the project 
activities to establish how much funds were spent where and how. This project, he argued, 
was funded by public money. The source was the Bank, but the ‘soft’ loan was payable by 
the government. Therefore, the government must keep track of its inputs. Whilst some junior 
officials in the government portrayed the secretary as a conscientious (naik, pious/god-
fearing) officer, the NS boss, Kaleemullah, insisted that his NGO was victimised because of 
his family’s political ties with the opposition party – the party that was in power under 
General Musharaf when the Enhanced Program was first started. Some non-governmental 
colleagues in the HIV sector resented the government’s decision to terminate the NS contract. 
According to them, the HASP surveillance had shown that the epidemic among IDUs had 
‘flattened’ in the cities where NS had been providing prevention services. One colleague was 
so upset about the ‘abrupt’ termination of the contract by ‘a non-HIV sector guy’ that he said 
‘this Punjab government guy should be taken out and shot dead for what he has done to NS’.  
Did the insistence of the government officials on records of inputs and service users mean 
that they could not understand or appreciate the rationale of the ‘output-based’ contracting, 
which had already been used widely in similar Bank-financed project worldwide? One way 
of looking at this dispute would be to suggest that it was the intersection between the 
proceduralism of the old style government bureaucracy, on one hand, and the flexibility of 
the new efficiency-oriented work culture of the Enhanced Program on the other, that 
precipitated this dispute, sustained it for some time, and led to the termination of the contract. 
The secretary was quick to respond to the centrality of the confidentiality principle of this 
new work culture when he dropped the demand for personal identifiers of IDUs. He must 
understand the logic of ‘output-based’ or ‘lumpsum’ contracting too, but somehow he did not 
accept this logic. For him, survey results like HASP, which were collected by NGO outreach 
workers, or the ‘certification’ by a private management consultancy firm hired under the 
Enhanced Program, was not how the government kept track of public money or held people 
accountable for its (mis)use. The ‘soft’ loan was, after all, payable by the tax-payers and the 
government must take responsibility for that. 
On the other hand, Kaleemullah was adamant on not sharing the project data with the 
government. He had hoped to reverse the termination of his NGO’s contract by lobbying in 
the Bank, UN, and the bilateral agencies. When he was unable to raise sufficient support from 
the donor community, he decided to ‘take the war to another front – the media’. He had news 
reports run on the BBC and Al-Jazeera about the ‘inhuman acts of the Punjab government’ in 
‘denying’ HIV prevention services to drug users. Doomsday scenarios were depicted for 
IDUs if NS’s contract was not revived. Local Urdu and English dailies printed stories about 
the apathy of the government towards an imminent HIV epidemic of which the drug users 
were portrayed as the main ‘drivers’. NS itself made a documentary film which highlighted 
the plight of drug users affected by the closure of its drop-in centres. This video was made 
available on youtube. One line of attack in this politics over the lives of drug users was NS’s 
assertion that the government was planning to round up and incarcerate IDUs which the NGO 
had successfully averted by protecting their names and addresses. The Punjab health 
department responded in the local media by counter allegations about the mishandling of 
public funds and stories of the NGO’s corruption.  Many colleagues in the HIV sector 
7 
 
privately criticised the wealthy chief executive and the top management of NS for trying to 
‘blackmail’ the government over the deaths of drug users and withdrawing even those 
services which it could provide outside the contract with the government.  
What was the object of this dispute? What was at stake in this conflict? According to some 
colleagues in the HIV sector, the gains made in HIV control in Pakistan could reverse with 
suspension of the prevention services of the NGO. But for the secretary and his followers, it 
was public money and its transparent use that was at stake if the NGO was not checked for its 
alleged corruption. NS maintained that the lives of the IDUs and their right to confidentiality 
that were at stake if they complied with the government’s demand. So, was it a case of ‘the 
state’ trying to assert its relevance even if the finances came from the World Bank – thereby 
performing one of the rituals that are required of it to ‘animate and naturalise metaphors if 
states are to succeed in being imagined as both higher than and encompassing of society’ 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002:984)? Was the NGO claiming its moral responsibility as ‘civil 
society’ to protect rights of those it claimed to serve, or was it trying to evade accountability 
by hiding behind the rhetoric of ‘human rights’ of those (IDUs) on whose very inhuman 
condition it thrived? These questions will become clearer in the following section. 
Nonetheless, this long-drawn out and bitter dispute between the AIDS officials of Pakistan’s 
largest province and the executives of the largest HIV prevention NGO in the country 
demonstrates the scale of the frictions that were created by the attempted reorganisation of 
the state and the society by pushing a neoliberal agenda of marketization.  
The dispute between NS and the government was not simply a matter of a mismatch between 
old style proceduralist bureaucracy and the new flexible work culture of entrepreneurial 
governance promulgated under the World Bank-financed Enhanced Program. Something 
more complicated was going on, something that took advantage of the ambiguities created by 
this intersection of different styles of governance. When the political pressure, lobbying and 
media campaigns of the NGO against the secretary and his followers failed to reverse the 
contract termination, the battle had to be fought in the legal arena. The dispute went into 
arbitration, where the text of the contract document itself assumed greater importance. This 
was well anticipated by the NGO. According to Dr Shareef, NS forged and tampered the 
contract documents with the help of Dr Wali just before he was deposed by the secretary. In 
the proceedings of the arbitration itself, the NGO had a very strong legal team as 
Kaleemullah came from a well-known family of barristers. By comparison, some government 
officials in blamed their weak position in the arbitration on the World Bank for designing 
‘output-based’ contracts, and therefore making it difficult for them to hold NS accountable. 
At the same time, some officials started to see this dispute as a ‘war of egos’ between 
Kaleemullah and the secretary - a war that was being fought on the turf of drug user’s lives. 
Brokerage and neo-primitive accumulation 
A very important actor in the ambiguous space of the Enhanced Program was a management 
consultancy firm that was hired, ostensibly to steer the ‘stakeholder’ through this confusion 
by building the capacity of the government officials to ‘manage contracts and carryout 
procurement… (and) provide the winning bidders (NGOs) with assistance in general 
management procedures and project implementation techniques’ (project appraisal document; 
p.15). The AIDS bureaucrats– those on secondment from other government departments or 
the newly-hired brilliance from ‘the market’ – had no experience of managing such contracts. 
The NGOs were also entering into this arrangement with the government for the first time. 
The firm that was selected for capacity building had no experience in public health, let alone 
HIV. Their main credential was that they had previously worked with the Bank for some 
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logistical procurement in Afghanistan. There was also a disconnection between hiring the 
firm and the rolling-out contracts to the NGOs. In the period before the government official’s 
capacities could be built, the firm began to play a very important role in awarding and 
directly managing contracts with the NGOs. According to the CEO of the firm; 
In the first quarter, we felt that it was not going to work because there was a rapid 
turnaround (of the government employees whose capacities were to be built) and 
secondly, our people were doing everything for them. We literally became 
programme secretariat and our people were doing ten times more work than 
contracted for. 
The firm dominated the management of NGOs contracts well beyond the first quarter. 
Initially, they complained about this ‘extra burden’ but as the project implementation went 
along, the firm found it more rewarding to manage the contracts by itself than build the 
capacities of the government officials. As an AIDS control official explained to me, ‘NGOs 
had to be certified by the management firm before any payments could be made to them’. 
Smaller NGOs were wary of the firm’s ‘auditing-like’ monitoring visits; for example, 
checking financial records and inventory registers and speaking directly to the service users 
to verify statistics. These visits offered no support to the NGOs but often resulted in delayed 
quarterly payments. In many cases, I was told, the visits created mistrust between NGOs and 
their service users. The firm might have been drawn involuntarily into doing things beyond 
the scope of its contract because, as the CEO put it, ‘everyone was learning by doing’. Once 
they found themselves in this role, however, they fully exploited the new flexible work 
culture, which cared less about following rules and procedures of the government and more 
about efficiency and output. When confronted with the question of deliberately overstepping 
their role, the CEO claimed that the contracts in the Enhanced Program were ambiguous: 
‘what we called monitoring, the government called it management’.  
Was it simply a matter of misunderstanding the nature of the object –‘monitoring’ or 
‘management’ –or of different ‘frames of reference’ (Mosse and Lewis 2005:8) between the 
firm, the government and the Bank? The firm must have spent extra money to do more than 
that would satisfy their contractual obligation. Why would they take on extra work? In a 
gesture of invoking sympathy, the CEO said; ‘we lost our shirt in it’, but ‘we valued the 
learning and capability injection’. 
As the ‘sign first decide later’ (Anders 2010) phase of the Enhanced Program wore off, some 
government officials in the health departments and the AIDS bureaucracy could not condone 
the transgression of what they believed was their proper right and duty, to ‘certify’ NGO 
performance and manage their contracts. For example, one of them, who was trained in 
public health like most other health bureaucrats, noted that in the next phase of the Enhanced 
Program, ‘the monitoring and review powers should be given to the government’s AIDS 
officials only, because the management firms know nothing about HIV/AIDS’. Smaller 
NGOs also maintained their claim about the unsuitability of the firm because ‘it didn’t know 
even the “abc” of HIV/AIDS or risk populations’. Some donor officials also regretted ‘the 
lack of capacity of the firm’. In other words, they upheld the Bank’s logic but objected, in 
retrospect, the choice of this particular actor. The firm, on the other hand, regarded those who 
were against it as politically motivated. The whole project, according to the CEO, had strong 
political underpinnings; ‘we asked the government not to make payments to the NGOs until 
we certified them but they (government) didn’t listen to us and this became a bone of 
contention between us and them’. ‘Lack of transparency’ was thus a rumour that the firm 
used against the government too. Meanwhile, the firm looked forward to working in the next 
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phase of the Enhanced Program, but the CEO warned that the ‘government intervention is the 
biggest demon. Sometimes even the Bank is helpless!’ 
Clearly, the executives at the firm assumed more for themselves than what they were 
originally contracted for. When confronted by their critics, they first tried to present their 
extra work as public service, but finding this as an unconvincing logic, they blamed the 
ambiguity of their contract and ‘corruption’ in the government as the reason for them ending 
up doing more than what was due (i.e. directly managing the contracts of NGOs instead of 
building the capacity of government officials to do that). Following Latour (1996), Lewis and 
Mosse (2006) argue that ‘there is not just a relativity of points of view on a given object (a 
question of perspective); rather objects appear or disappear  depending upon interpretations 
given them by people of different standing’ (p.8). The ‘war of interpretations’ between actors 
using various frames of reference will remain inconclusive in this shifting cloud of objects, 
events and actors. However, what was significant for the fate of the Enhanced Program is that 
the firm became a broker between the government and the NGOs as it tried to develop a 
niche for itself in brokering the chances of the NGOs for the continuation of their contracts.  
Actor-oriented approaches in anthropology have studied brokers as intermediary actors at the 
interface of different worldviews, negotiating relationships between them (e.g. see Long and 
Long 1992). However, these approaches have been criticised for ‘compartmentalising 
identities’ and ignoring ‘various types of exchanges, strategic adaptations, or translations 
contained within development interventions’ (Lewis and Mosse 2006:10). Others have 
located brokerage in the ‘fragmented politics of the postcolonial states’, where a ‘weak state’ 
is deemed unable to enforce its rationality and therefore co-opts patron-client relationships to 
maintain its relevance (see e.g. Bierschenk, Chauveau, and de Sardan 2002). Whilst such 
approaches might be helpful in explaining the flourishing of intermediary actors and 
organisations in development – not only in the postcolony but in the translocal and 
transnational world of expert knowledge – Latour (1996) warns us against the a priori 
sociological certainty of institutional realms implied in these approaches. Following Latour, 
for Lewis and Mosse (2006), ‘it is the mutual enrolment and interlocking of interests that 
produce project realities’. They call this the work of ‘generating and translating interest, 
creating context by tying in supporters and sustaining interpretations’ (p.13).  
One such interlocking in the Enhanced Program was described by Kaleemullah, the 
aforementioned chief executive of the NGO, NS; 
There were three [main] players [in the Enhanced Program] – the Bank, the 
government, and the NGOs. That means you have the public sector, the private sector 
and the donor. Now you needed somebody between these three to translate what the 
others meant. ...The firm played a crucial role of explaining [‘lumpsum’ contracting] 
it to the government. The government asked us for audit reports, we were told not to 
give these reports with receipts, so somebody had to explain to us what should we 
submit… Same with the Bank; what is an ‘output-based’ [contract]? I mean.... how 
would you measure the outputs? So, I think the firm did play an important role. They 
were like a coordinating body, a good communication channel. 
It is questionable how a firm that did not clearly understand the terms of its own contract –as 
they claimed when they said ‘what we called monitoring, the government called it 
management’ – could make sense of others’ contracts to them? Intriguingly, the firm never 
reported negatively on the performance of NS, which was responsible for 70% of the funds 
allocated for HIV prevention among drug users. According to a senior AIDS control officer, 
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the bosses of the firm reprimanded even their own staff if they tried to question this particular 
NGO’s performance. Meanwhile, the efficiency-oriented flexible work culture of the 
Enhanced Program and the ‘output-based’ nature of the contracts meant that the former AIDS 
control manager of Punjab, Dr Wali, was not obliged to cross-check NS’s on-the-ground 
provision of services. On his part, Kaleemullah sent Dr Wali on international trips, helped 
him raise his profile by featuring him in the quarterly reports of the NGO, and there was also 
a talk about the ‘farmhouse parties’ being thrown at Kaleemullah’s property. 
The troika of the management consultancy firm, the big NGO and the discredited provincial 
AIDS control manager ‘assembled’ (DeLanda 2006) in response to big money pushed into 
the HIV sector by the Bank, and exploited the ambiguous spaces created by the flexible 
bureaucracy of the Enhanced Program in a manner that I consider not very different from 
‘primitive accumulation’ (Elyachar 2005). By the end of my fieldwork in July 2011, though 
the aforementioned dispute between NS and the government was still into arbitration, the 
health secretary was removed from his post and nothing substantial could come out of the 
inquiry against Dr Wali. Instead, on the basis of the social and other capitals he had 
accumulated under the Enhanced Program with the help of Kaleemullah, Dr Wali got himself 
appointed as a senior officer in a federally run Global Fund sponsored project. The dividends 
for NS were no smaller. Before the Enhanced Programme began in 2003, it was being 
investigated by the European Commission on allegations of misusing funds, but in the next 
several years of partnership in the Enhanced Program its staff had grown from 50 to 500, 
with many regional offices, branching out and up. It had grown so big that it could ‘shaft’ the 
former ACP manager for his ambitions to negotiate a larger slice of the upcoming Global 
Fund grant for the government in relation to NS as the preferred ‘civil society’ partner. 
Likewise, the firm, which was selected in the Enhanced Program despite its lack of public 
health experience – due to its good will within the Bank – now had its fill of ‘capability 
injection’ and was all set and ‘waiting for the next round of funding from the Bank’. 
Entrepreneurial selves 
The ambiguity in bureaucratic field of HIV governance which resulted from the introduction 
of new flexible work culture on the behest of the Work Bank was profitably exploited by the 
big NGO, its broker – the management firm, and a collaborator in the government for their 
own accumulation. What became of the Enhanced Program, and of the employees it had 
attracted to work at the ACP, is revealing of the precariousness of dependence on external 
donors, in this case the World Bank, and the insecurities generated by the push for neoliberal 
policies. The Enhanced Program completed its first five-yearly phase in 2009 and was 
extended for one more year. The Bank was committed to finance a second five-yearly phase 
from 2010, for which the government had already prepared the requisite project proposal (the 
PC1 in Pakistani bureaucratic parlance). Small NGOs, who had completed their contracts in 
2009, continued to provide HIV prevention to their target groups in the hope of retrospective 
funding and improving their chances of selection in the second phase – keeping their 
‘Frankenstein monsters’ alive (Kapilashrami 2010:225). In July 2010 rumours emerged that 
the Bank was not going to finance HIV prevention in Pakistan anymore. It was neither 
confirmed nor denied by the Bank. In August that year Pakistan was hit by the greatest 
deluge of floods in its history; the government issued a general appeal to development 
partners to prioritise flood relief; and the Bank now had an official reason to explain its 
withdrawal from the HIV sector – a perfect escape hatch into a ‘humanitarian triage’. No one 
in the HIV sector believed that the floods were the real reason for the Bank’s withdrawal. 
Rumours became ‘effective vehicles to challenge official accounts’ (Gupta 1995:388). 
11 
 
According to a popular one, the Bank was not interested in HIV in the first place, and that it 
had financed the first phase of the Enhanced Program only to ‘improve their own balance 
sheet’ by pushing a ‘soft’ loan  to General Musharaf’s military regime in 2003, which was 
favourably poised towards neoliberal ideals, in desperate need of international recognition 
and partnership, and keen to project a positive, soft and progressive image abroad by 
investing big money in HIV prevention among marginalised populations back at home. Some 
suggested that the recent approval of the Global Fund grant for HIV meant that the Bank 
would be pushed to the back seat in the overall HIV response, and hence, they decided to pull 
out altogether.  
These were desperate times for the employees at the ACP, where I worked as an internee. 
They had pinned their hopes on the continuation of the Enhanced Program over the next five 
years but now these hopes were stalled because the Bank would not finance HIV prevention. 
Things started to fall apart for this organisation. Most of the ‘market-based’ staff were either 
laid off due to lack of funds or left voluntarily for aid agencies and international NGOs, 
which valued them for their insider knowledge of a government bureaucracy. It was not 
unusual those days for the remaining employees to spread false rumours about good job 
offers for themselves in order to better their bargain by falsely inflating their own ‘market-
value’ or simply to show off their loyalty to the ACP by ostensibly declining good offers.  
This ‘calculatingly charismatic’ (du Gay 1994) conduct stands in contrast to the figure of a 
personally detached bureaucrat in traditional government departments. In the backdrop of a 
Weberian description of bureaucratic conduct as something governed by completely different 
ethos than those governing the ethical life of entrepreneurs or politicians, and the insistence 
on certain irreducibility of these spheres as necessary for their conduct (1968:1404), I suggest 
that at the ACP, the conduct of government officials was an entanglement of bureaucratic, 
entrepreneurial, and political ethos. The entrepreneurial aspects of their selves were fore-
grounded in the new bureaucratic culture of the Enhanced Program and their entrepreneurial 
abilities were put to test when the HIV prevention market was finally rolled up, with its main 
financier, the Work Bank, withdrawing its funding commitment. 
Conclusion 
The neoliberal logic of entrepreneurial governance through contractualization does not 
demonstrably generate greater efficiency – it dispossesses. The Enhanced Program ultimately 
doubly dispossessed the subjects of its intended beneficiaries, the ‘risk groups’. First, when 
the state’s inability to work with quasi-legal groups was put forward as the rationale for the 
private sector’s takeover, the governance of HIV moved from the public to the private sector 
and was ‘de-statized’ (Rose 1996:56). The social and regulatory operations of the state were 
contracted out to NGOs, weakening the state institutions and depriving them of any 
opportunity to evolve. This also undermined any claims on the state that the members of the 
so-called ‘quasi-legal groups’ might pursue. Secondly, the flexible bureaucracy and the 
entrepreneurial governance of the Enhanced Program, which shelved rules and regulations in 
the name of market-driven ‘efficiency’ – an emphasis on ‘outputs’ in place of a scrutiny of 
inputs – gave occasion to the borrowed money ending up in the pockets of a few powerful 
individuals. This, I suggest, constitutes accumulation by dispossessing the future generations.  
After all, the money borrowed in the name of public has to be returned by the taxpayers – 
they were dispossessed even before they had it.  
The dispossession of many for the accumulation by some in the ambiguous space created by 
the reorganisation of AIDS bureaucracy appears to be precisely the reason for the World 
Bank-pushed models of development gaining such currency in countries like Pakistan. David 
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Graeber (2010) hits the nail on the head when he argues, following Harvey (2005), that ‘the 
greatest beneficiaries of neoliberal policies have been the staff of the emerging administrative 
apparatus itself’ (p.88). Therefore, ‘efficiency’ – the ethic at the heart of such policies – is to 
the postcolony what ‘trade’ was to colonies; a smokescreen for foreign intervention to the 
benefit of transnational and translocal elite. In the case of the Enhanced Program, I have 
described clouds of blame-shifting and denouncements of the various partners which settle on 
two further issues. First is that the management consultancy firm was appointed due to its 
previous links in the Bank despite lack of expertise in the HIV sector, and proceeded to 
overstep its role and take over the management of contracts and certification of NGOs, 
emerging as a broker between the government and NGOs, most of whom remained at 
loggerheads with it over this issue. Second is that a power triangle emerged between the 
biggest NGO in the project, the management firm and a senior AIDS official as an 
‘assemblage’ (DeLanda 2006) for ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2005).  
The shift away from the public sector did not mean less government, as it might appear with 
the promotion of NGO/private sector for service delivery and the flight of (human) capital 
from the government’s AIDS control departments, but a ‘bureaucratization of the world’ 
(Graeber 2010). A new mode of governance was taking shape, turning employees into 
subjects of an ‘entrepreneurial self’ (Kelly 2006). The myth of ‘efficiency’ enacted in the 
rituals of ‘flexible governance’ turned institutions like the ACP into hatcheries of private 
interest, where employees became proprietors of their positions. They were now trained in 
principles of efficient business as the Enhanced Program turned the HIV response into a 
market.  
References  
 
Anders, G. 2010. In the shadow of good governance: an ethnography of civil service reform 
in Africa: Brill. 
Bierschenk, T, J.P Chauveau, and O. de Sardan. 2002. Local development brokers in Africa: 
The rise of a new social category. In Working paper No. 13, Department of 
Anthropolgy and African Studies. Mainz: Germany: Johannes Gutenberg University. 
DeLanda, M. 2006. A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
du Gay, P. 2000. Entrepreneurial Governance and Public Management: The Anti-
Bureaucrats. In New Managerialism, New Welfare?, edited by E. McLaughlin, J. 
Clarke and S. Gewirtz. London: Sage. 
du Gay, Paul. 1994. Making up Managers: Bureaucracy, Enterprise and the Liberal Art of 
Separation. The British Journal of Sociology 45 (4):655-674. 
Elyachar, J. 2005. Markets of dispossession: NGOs, economic development, and the state in 
Cairo. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Elyachar, Julia. 2002. Empowerment money: The World Bank, non-governmental 
organizations, and the value of culture in Egypt. Public Culture 14 (3):493-513. 
Ferguson, James, and Akhil Gupta. 2002. Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of 
Neoliberal Governmentality. American Ethnologist 29 (4):981-1002. 
Graeber, D. 2010. Neoliberalism, or The Bureaucratisation of the World. In The Insecure 
American: How We Got Here and What We Should Do About It, edited by H. 
Gusterson and C. Bestman. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gupta, A. 1995. Blurred Boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics and 
the imagined state. American Ethnologist 22:375-402. 
Harvey, D. 2005. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
13 
 
Hull, M.S. 2012. Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan: 
University of California Press. 
Kapilashrami, Anuj. 2010. Understanding public private partnerships: the discourse, the 
practice, and the system wide effects of the global fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, 
and malaria., Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh. 
Kelly, Peter. 2006. The Entrepreneurial Self and Youth at-risk': Exploring the Horizons of 
Identity in the Twenty-first Century. Journal of Youth Studies 9 (1):17-32. 
Latour, B. 1996. Aramis, or the love of technology. Translated by C. Porter. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
———. 1996. On actor-network theory. A few clarifications. SOZIALE 47 (4):369-381. 
Lewis, David, and David Mosse, eds. 2006. Development Brokers and Translators of Aid 
policy and Practice. London: Ann Arbor, MI.:Pluto Press. 
Leys, Colin. 2006. The cynical state. Socialist Register 42 (42):1-27. 
Long, N. , and A. Long, eds. 1992. Battlefields of knowledge: The interlocking of theory and 
practice in social research and development. London: Routledge. 
Moir, Martin. 1993. Kaghazi Raj: Notes on the Documentary Basis of Company Rule, 1771–
1858. Indo-British Review 21:185–93. 
Mosse, D., and D.J. Lewis. 2005. The aid effect: giving and governing in international 
development. London: Pluto Press. 
Mosse, David. 2005. Cultivating Development: An Ethnograhy of AID Policy and Practice. 
London: Ann Arbor, MI. :Pluto Press. 
Rose, N. 1996. Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sarkar, J. 1935. Mughal administration: M.C. Sarkar. 
Saumarez-Smith, R. 1985. Rule-by-records and rule-by-reports: complementary aspects of 
the British Imperial rule of law. Contributions to Indian Sociology 19:153-76. 
Weber, M. 1968. Economy and society, 3. New York: Bedminster. 
Zaidi, Shehla. 2008. A policy analysis of contracting NGOs in Pakistan: NGO-government 
engagement, HIV prevention and the dynamics of policy and political factors, London 
School of Hygiene, London. 
 
 
